Kant's object-ivity (Reading on the TTC)

About the most exciting thing to happen today was reading the book on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Luckily it was fairly exciting, mostly because there seems to be something wrong with his formulation (at least, as presented in the book). It's not that the formulation is wrong per se, but that it assumes something that's not necessarily true (the idea of bounds between percepts being "objects"), though this may just be a semantic falling-out.

Basically, we know that a "bundle" of percepts can readily belong to multiple "objects", and that the percepts' assignment to an object can change (the various illusions where the mind sees two different images spring to mind). I'd agree with the idea, however, if he were to substitute "pattern" for "object", and instead of a pattern "binding" a set of percepts, it matches (more or less) a set of percepts.

Obviously both of those can be understood as simple definition problems, but so far the argument (as presented in the book) seems to be proposing that all of existence as we model it in our mind is clear-cut and bound to "objects" which bounce about in a Newtonian billiards game. I know, I know, I should wait until I've finished the secondary source and the primary source before I start criticising it, but by then I'll likely have forgotten what bothered me today.


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